Page 3 state boundaries" (Gottlieb, 1994, 100) . In effect, Gottlieb calls for an expansion of the Wilsonian premise of self-determination as well as an augmentation of state-hood as defined by Westphalian thought (Gottlieb, 1994, 112 ).
Gottlieb offers a well-structured argument for their political transformation based on the current world status. His argument towards regional stability depends on his assertion that peaceful democracies are more successful when the population enjoys a homogeneous cultural and religious identity rather than "harsh linguistic and cultural antagonisms" (Gottlieb, 1994, 101) . By defining a nation as a function of its "kinships, sentiments, affinity, culture, and loyalt [ies] ," nations can certainly transcend the borders of established states, albeit the nation may not enjoy borders of its own. Using these criteria, people of a certain geographic location could be a national or citizen of another state (Gottlieb, 1994, 105) .
The minute differentiations between a national and citizen, according to Gottlieb, provide for a "constructive" classification of different civil, political, and socio-economic rights. These rights would in turn dissolve much of the tensions in culturally diverse regions of conflict. "A form of union that involves peoples rather than territories and that leaves international frontiers untouched could help resolve tensions" (Gottlieb, 1994, 109-110) . Although the political gains of the Middle East has been rapid relative to the development the western world, Jordan must not bypass a rung while climbing the ladder of political modernization. Doing so might adversely affect Jordan's stability incurring long-term consequences. Hence, King Hussein realizes that he must lead Jordan into an era where the Hashemite Kingdom defines its legitimacy through not only personal and ideological means, but also a sound structural base.
The liberalization of Jordan in the last five years has certainly been a progressive change for the King. Initiated after the riots of 1989, the elections of a parliament were a first step towards meeting the needs of the contemporary Jordanian people. These elections were particularly significant. Although the King had many options in diffusing the situation, he called for the reestablishment of a popularly elected body to serve the people. In retrospect, it has been thirty years Ryan D. Teksten, © 1995 Page 4 since the last parliament met. The top-down approach towards liberalization and steps toward democracy indicated a new outlook and change for the future (Roberts, 1991, 122) .
As a sign of quick political maturity, the independent candidates aligned with a certain cause. The Islamic Trend successfully grasped twenty of the twenty-six contested seats. Its success was a direct result of the unique relationship it maintains between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Hashemite Regime (Roberts, 1991, 122) . Although the reform was top-down, the involvement was primarily bottom-up. The successful election required grassroots participation from its people, and they responded. Because the election was a resultant of economically based uprisings, popular activity validates the acceptance of a relatively liberal political system in Jordan.
More importantly, a national identity is becoming refined through the political expressions of Jordanian citizens (Roberts, 1991, 122) .
Refining the Jordanian identity will allow the country to ultimately participate in the political transformation as called for by Gottlieb. If Jordan clearly defines itself as a nonPalestinian state, the sovereignty is ready to begin introducing changes without threatening the monarchy. This move will act as a catalyst for a customs or economic union, or even a common market between regional states in the Middle East. In any case, politics will remain independent of territories, and the region will enjoy the benefits of reduced tariffs and free travel between borders.
By deflating the Palestinian issue, King Hussein puts his country in a position where the government can take advantage of new trading opportunities while simultaneously dealing with the Palestinian issue, which is costly in terms of money and relative legitimacy.
One of King Hussein's efforts, now more than before, is meeting the needs of the original Jordanian citizens while balancing the requirements of a large Palestinian population. In the past, King Hussein created a careful integration of these different groups. He purposely placed the leaders of many diverse families and tribes in key roles within the government and complex bureaucracy. These positions brought together a diverse population, but also helped to create intermediaries who linked the government with its people (Tal, 1993, 47) . Kingdom? His earlier trends in political modernization hint at his future direction (Tal, 1993, 54-55 (Hudson, 1977, 14) . A redefinition of the Jordanian identity, which is coming about presently, will provide the necessary foundation upon which the structural base will take hold more readily. affecting the state. The hereditary ties allow the leader to rule as well as reign over his kingdom (Hudson, 1977, 18-19 ).
An ideological foundation of legitimacy grows as a particular outlook of life forms a template. The past, present, and future are explained or forecasted through this template. It is through the influencing of the society's template that a leader holds a grasp on the public's reaction to decisions made by the state. Effectively rallying around nationalism is one very common method used by Arab leaders to increase the relative power of their regime (Hudson, 1977, 20 ).
The refinement of existing procedures and policies foster structural legitimacy in the Middle East. Occupying an established post or position authorizes referent power contingent on the title alone. Whether a caliph, sultan, or sheik, the title initially shadows personal attributes.
Nonetheless, poor leadership will surely cause a leader to self-destruct in the long run. As Hudson points out, as a society modernizes, the scope of legitimacy increases (Hudson, 1977, 22-23) .
King Hussein has woven a complex web of legitimacy, involving all three catalysts Jordan to renegotiate its financial debt from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). As a result, the Jordanian economy saw soaring prices that later resulted in the previously mentioned riots.
"To control this crisis, the regime was forced to grant democratic reforms" (Talhami, 1993, 52) . To control the ensuing crisis, Jordan turned to its internal capabilities.
Since Jordan was endowed with relatively few natural resources, the development of human resources has been a large contributor to the national Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This development resulted from a need to offset the externally controlled oil markets. Although there exists a number of oil fields, this supply is limited and highly dependent on the world oil market.
As with any country that specializes in one natural resource, a comparative advantage must exist to remain competitive in the global market. The conscious concentration of human resources was a direct result of the lack of natural resources (Roy and Irelan, 1992, 178) .
The national policy of education has ironically led to a decline in the economy. Jreisat and Freij attribute a slowdown in the economy to three external factors. The lack of demand for Jordanian labor (especially highly educated laborers), returnees from other gulf states at a rate of 5,000 people per year, and a drop in Jordanian workers in foreign countries, all pose a problem for the work force. The same authors find that the following three internal factors do not counteract the affects of external factors. The economic depression in 1982, the increase of college graduates (which adds to the structural unemployment), and the availability of cheap technical and skilled foreign labor forced a magnification of the externally driven consequences (Jreisat and Freij, 1991, 106) .
The Hashemite government balances the need to reform the current political system and the protection of the Hashemite legacy. Taking an active roll in education on a national scale is one insurance policy used by King Hussein (Roberts, 1991, 133) . The current educational crisis has direct destabilizing possibilities. There exist two accepted outcomes from this situation. Either a backlash will result from efforts of "trying to change society's expectation regarding educational choices," or from the "effects that stem from an incorrect government interpretation of Jordan's economic future" (Roy and Irelan, 1992, 214) .
The Gulf War placed the country into a state of flux. Jordan remained a relatively neutral country during the conflict. While calling for the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait, King
Hussein simultaneously called for a resolution through peaceful means. Nonetheless, Jordan was punished for not taking a definitive side during the war. Fence sitting was seen as sympathetic to Iraq, and destructive to the U.S. and Saudi-lead mission. Consequently, the reparations were fairly severe. Jordanian nationals working abroad (and investing domestically) were fired from their jobs and many were expelled from the Gulf States (Ahmed and Williams-Ahmed, 1993, 33) . The dismissals numbered as large as 300,000 people. Furthermore, their return to Jordan caused more problems (Talhami, 1993, 52) .
At the conclusion of the Gulf War, a series of reactionary changes based on the economic situation threatened the stability of Jordan's politics. The end of the Gulf War saw the number of Jordanian nationals working abroad dramatically decrease. Not only were these people no longer sending remittances home, they were returning in numbers large enough to possibly overwhelmed Ryan D. Teksten, © 1995 Page 9
society's existing balance of housing, schools, public service offices, and unemployment. If unemployment rose significantly, so could the inflation rate, partially fueled by scarcity of goods.
These circumstances would result in a situation where Jordanian currency is severely weak in the currency market while the country had few goods to offer to maintain their current account balance. Finally, the absence of aid from the U.S. and Gulf states ($333 million annually) had the possibility to cause a massive political movement towards radicalization on the magnitude to destabilize the monarchy (Ahmed and Williams-Ahmed, 1993, 34; Talhami, 1993, 52-53) . Once again, Jordan was at the mercy of external factors.
In an effort to put Jordan back on track, the Bush administration promised to restore economic aid and the promised Department of Agriculture guarantees at the rate of $95 million if
Jordan made proper progress in the peace process in the Middle East. Jordan's future remains influenced largely by its past. The deliberate role of Jordan in the Gulf War resulted in the bestcase scenario for Jordan. Nonetheless, the Gulf War had a tremendous impact on Jordanian society, demonstrating the vulnerability of Jordanian economics due to external factors.
